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By Peter Margulies  Tuesday, December 12, 2017, 1:00 PM
The substance and tone of the Dec. 8 Fourth Circuit en banc argument in International Refugee Assistance Project (IRAP) v. Trump differed
substantially from the Dec. 6 Ninth Circuit argument in Hawaii’s challenge to the travel ban (EO-3). The Ninth Circuit panel in Hawaii v.
Trump assessed the government’s un-cabined claim of authority under 8 U.S.C. § 1182(f) against what Hawaii’s lawyer, Neal Katyal, called
the “½nely reticulated” scheme of the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA). In contrast, the IRAP argument–by the ACLU’s Cecillia Wang—
acknowledged the INA argument against EO-3 but stressed the more dif½cult establishment clause claim. If the Hawaii and IRAP cases end
up consolidated in the Supreme Court, EO-3’s challengers will have to pivot away from the establishment clause and instead emphasize EO-
3’s con¾ict with the INA’s anti-discrimination provision, 8 U.S.C. § 1152(a)1)(A), and with the statute’s overall plan, structure and purpose.
The government, represented in the Fourth Circuit by Deputy Assistant Attorney General Hashim Mooppan, again argued for an un-cabined
reading of § 1182(f), which authorizes the president to limit the entry of foreign nationals “detrimental to the interests of the United
States.” Mooppan sought to cloak this reading in neutral terms, describing EO-3 as the result of a multi-agency process. However, Mooppan
countenanced only frail checks on executive authority. Pushed by Judge Barbara Milano Keenan on whether the government’s reading had a
limiting principle, Mooppan offered two ethereal examples. First, the president can’t announce, “I don’t like immigrants,” and then bar
entry of all immigrants to the United States. Short of that absolute ban—and a second hypothetical ban on immigrant men that Mooppan
conceded would trigger constitutional concerns—Mooppan rejected any limits on executive power.
The sweeping authority claimed by the government would empower the president to unilaterally reimpose the national origin quotas that
Congress had decisively rejected in 1965. As I discussed in this post, .Congress enacted the INA’s anti-discrimination provision to preclude
any attempt, including one resembling EO-3’s inde½nite bar on entry of immigrants, to restore the quota system through executive ½at. To
shield the government from this criticism, Mooppan sought to , discount § 1152(a)(1)(A) as a mere technical measure barring discrimination
in the physical issuance of a hard-copy immigrant visa, but not discrimination in the entry of visa-holders into the United States.
The government’s marginalization of the INA’s antidiscrimination mandate violates the “most basic” canon of statutory interpretation,
which counsels against interpreting statutory language as super¾uous (as was demonstrated in the 2009 case Corley v. United States, in
which the court observed that a statute “should be construed so that … no part will be inoperative or super¾uous, void or insigni½cant”).
Suppose a president could avoid the anti-discrimination mandate merely by styling inde½nite restrictions on immigration as limits on entry.
The mandate would dwindle into insigni½cance. The neutering of a statutory provision that Congress labored to pass in 1965 would clash
with the “common sense” reading of statutes that the Supreme Court has repeatedly urged, as in FDA v. Brown & Williamson.
Moreover, § 1182(f)—the “entry” provision relied on by the government—actually has a far more tailored pedigree than the government
acknowledged. The immigration scholars’ amicus brief that Alan Schoenfeld and I ½led in the Fourth Circuit and Ninth Circuit explains that
in 1941, Congress enacted a precursor to § 1182(f) at President Franklin D. Roosevelt’s request that authorized the president to exclude
foreign nationals “prejudicial to the interests of the United States.” Prior to the 1941 statute’s passage, the conservative Republican Robert
Taft of Ohio cautioned against the “extreme” power that the Roosevelt administration sought. Responding to Taft’s warning, Roosevelt
assured Congress that the proposed statute only authorized denial of entry to spies or other agents of hostile governments (amicus brief, pp.
21-23). Regulations implementing the statute observed these limits.
Section 1182(f), which Congress enacted in 1952, made this authority available even on those rare occasions when the world was entirely at
peace. However, nothing in the new statute suggested that Congress wished to depart from the tailored reading of the 1941 statute and
authorize the sweeping authority that the Trump administration has now claimed. Reinforcing this view, in 1978 Congress expressly made
the 1941 statute applicable even when there was no state of war between two or more states (see current 8 U.S.C. § 1185(a)(1)). However, the
1978 legislation actually constrained executive authority in important ways, notably by barring the president from imposing categorical
restrictions on citizens’ travel abroad. Indeed, the Senate Foreign Relations Committee explained this curbing of executive discretion by
noting the absence of any “sound reason … for the re-establishment of a U.S. passport policy which identi½es certain countries as being
politically or ideologically taboo.”
EO-3 seeks to return to the categorical restrictions that Congress has repeatedly condemned. That makes it an example of what the Supreme
Court, in Whitman v. American Trucking Association, called “elephants in mouseholes”—sweeping claims of authority that the executive
branch tries to shoehorn into a deliberately narrow statutory space.
While the government has also argued that the president has separate authority to exclude foreign nationals under Article II of the
Constitution, its authority for that argument is suspect. The government relies on United States ex rel. Knauff v. Shaughnessy, in which the
Supreme Court denied a habeas corpus petition brought by a foreign national whom the government had detained as a security risk when
that person sought to enter the United States. However, the government’s reliance is misplaced. In dicta, the Knauff court discussed
executive power to exclude foreign nationals (pp. 541-42). That description was not necessary to the court’s holding, which turned on the
constitutionality of the predecessor to 8 U.S.C. § 1185(a)(1). In that provision, Congress delegated a limited power to the president to
exclude foreign nationals; Knauff turned on the constitutionality of the statute. It did not address the legality of unilateral executive action,
which in Knauff was limited to exclusion of one foreign national, not the tens of thousands affected by EO-3.
The Fourth Circuit judges seemed less interested than their Ninth Circuit counterparts in drilling down to the statutory details. In addition,
longstanding organizational opposition to executive restrictions on entry blunted IRAP’s efforts to challenge the government’s statutory
stance. Consider EO-3’s consistency with past practice, including President Carter’s suspension of visas during the Iranian hostage crisis,
President Reagan’s suspension of visas to Cuba to remediate the problems caused by the Mariel Boatlift, and Reagan’s interdiction of foreign
nationals without visas on the high seas (subsequently upheld by the Supreme Court in Haitian Centers Council v. Sale). Each of these actions
was far more tethered than EO-3 to exigent foreign policy contexts, including responding to ¾agrant violations of international law or
preventing mass migration by inadmissible foreign nationals. However, Wang argued that the actions not reviewed by the courts were illegal.
While this view has some support, in the challenge to EO-3, such arguments reinforce the government’s contention that past practice and
EO-3 are on all fours.
However, past practice also creates problems for the government, which DOJ lawyer Mooppan tried unsuccessfully to ½nesse at the Fourth
Circuit. For the government, past practice in this case is an interpretive tool that only the government can use. Mooppan invoked past
practice to sanction EO-3 but asserted that the INA provided no basis for distinguishing EO-3 from the actions of past presidents such as
Carter and Reagan. On this view, history is relevant only if it supports EO-3. However, Mooppan asserted that distinguishing EO-3 by
highlighting the exigent circumstances in the Iranian hostage crisis or the mass migrations faced by President Reagan inserted a “made-up
emergency exception” into the INA.
The Supreme Court’s treatment of past practice has resisted such arbitrary limits, particularly when past practice sheds light on the
relationship between the president and Congress. In Dames & Moore v. Regan, Chief Justice William Rehnquist acknowledged that courts
should consider the character and duration of past executive branch practice when assessing the legality of a new presidential initiative. The
court in Dames & Moore found that the longstanding practice of presidential claims settlement in foreign affairs supported President
Carter’s settlement of claims with Iran as part of the deal resolving the hostage crisis. However, the court subsequently found in Medellin v.
Texas that President George W. Bush’s attempt to force Texas to comply with decisions of the International Court of Justice regarding
criminal procedure did not ½t under the claims settlement rubric.
As cases like Dames & Moore and Medellin demonstrate, the turn to past practice inevitably requires the courts to address the ½t between
history and the present action. Analyzing that ½t requires common sense criteria, including the exigency factor raised by EO-3’s challengers.
The government’s real complaint isn’t with the criteria for assessing the lessons of history, but with the particular criteria (suggested by the
challengers) exposing EO-3’s departure from past practice.
An argument exploring the INA and past practice in-depth would have aided the Fourth Circuit’s deliberations; unfortunately, both IRAP
and the Fourth Circuit elevated the establishment clause argument at the statutory claim’s expense. This was a dubious choice. As Josh
Blackman has demonstrated the establishment clause is a poor ½t for complex issues of foreign policy. At the Fourth Circuit, the challengers
may well persuade a majority of the judges, with only Judges Shedd, Agee, and Niemeyer vigorously dissenting. However, the stage will shift
at the next level, if the Supreme Court grants certiorari. While it is premature to assert that the court’s recent stay allowing EO-3 to go into
effect telegraphed its view of the merits, challengers of EO-3 will almost certainly need either Chief Justice John Roberts or Justice Anthony
Kennedy. Neither seems likely to embrace the establishment clause claim.
Reinforcing the problems with this part of the challenge, the Fourth Circuit spent several minutes grilling Mooppan about a classi½ed report
that the government had prepared regarding countries listed or considered for listing in EO-3. But the challenge to EO-3 will fail if it
devolves into a dispute about the courts’ access to classi½ed information; that factor always bolsters the government’s case for deference.
Winning in court requires framing an argument effectively. The argument that EO-3 doesn’t ½t the INA—a common sense argument—may
½nd an audience at the Supreme Court. However, that argument requires framing EO-3 as a departure from past practice. Stressing the
establishment clause crowds out the nuance that the statutory claim requires. It follows that challengers should resist the siren song of the
establishment clause and focus on the statutory claim. 
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